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TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF GAMBLING 
 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly  
University of North Dakota 
 
 Mark R. Dixon 
Southern Illinois University 
 
 
Although the activity of gambling and the research on gambling continues to grow every year, 
behavior analysts have contributed minimally to the published literature. Theories of 
gambling abound from social to neurological frameworks, yet empirical data supporting such 
tenets is less than overwhelming.  The science of behavior analysis often seeks data first and 
theory later.  As a result, in the absence of a large body of data, behavior analysis has yet to 
put forward a comprehensive theoretical account of gambling behavior.  Albeit limited, the 
behavioral data continue to emerge and collectively they begin to represent the foundation 
upon which a theory of gambling may rest.  The present paper proposes an integrated 
behavioral model of pathological gambling, based on data, and consistent within a naturalistic 
account of scientific inquiry.   




     The activity of gambling has been a part of 
human cultures for thousands of years.  It has 
been reported that the early Greeks gambled 
for food, soldiers cast dice for Jesus’ belong-
ings, and the founding fathers in the United 
States gambled regularly as a leisure-time ac-
tivity.  While gambling behavior is certainly 
not new in our culture, it appears quite clear 
that in modern times its prevalence is grow-
ing, especially in the United States (see Petry, 
2005, for a recent review).  In a recent report, 
Petry (2005) concluded the rate of pathologi-
cal gambling was likely between 1 – 2% 
worldwide.  Although this percentage in rela-
tive terms may be small, in absolute terms it 
represents millions of people.  This 
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estimate also does not include problem gam-
blers, who display some symptoms of patho-
logical gambling but not enough to meet cur-
rent criteria for pathology.  In short, gam-
bling, and the problems associated with it, 
affects many people. 
 Researchers in the behavioral sciences 
have not ignored the study of gambling.  For 
instance, a literature search conducted using 
PsychINFO on March 21, 2007, using the 
word “gambling” in a general keyword search 
identified 3,038 articles.  However, upon 
cross-referencing “gambling” with “expe-
riment,” the resulting number of articles was 
reduced to 154.  A cross-referenced search of 
“gambling” and “behavior analysis” identified 
only 13 articles.  While these analyses are 
cursory, they help highlight two glaring holes 
in the literature on gambling.  Namely, very 
little of the research being conducted on gam-
bling is using experimental methodology and 
less yet is coming from the behavior-analytic 
perspective. 
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     There are numerous reasons for both these 
occurrences.  For one, there are only a hand-
ful of researchers in the field of behavior 
analysis who identify gambling behavior as 
their primary research focus.  Another issue is 
that in most locations, including nearly every 
state in the United States, laws governing 
gambling make it nearly impossible to 
conduct reasonably valid experiments on 
gambling behavior (see Weatherly & Phelps, 
2006, for a review of this issue).  Additional 
reasons include the fact that, although the be-
havior-analytic perspective dominated the 
field of psychology in the middle of the last 
century, numerous competing theoretical 
perspectives exist today.  Likewise, funding 
agencies charged with supporting research 
and theory on issues such as pathological 
gambling, although not necessarily anti-
behavioral, are populated by individuals from 
these other perspectives.  Obviously, if the 
behavior analysis of gambling is to be a suc-
cessful approach, then these reasons need to 
be faced and rectified. 
     The purpose of the present paper is sever-
al-fold.  First, it is designed to give an over-
view of the behavioral perspective on gam-
bling to date.  This overview is not compre-
hensive, partially because such reviews exist 
elsewhere (e.g., see Ghezzi, Lyons, Dixon, & 
Wilson, 2006).  However, it should serve to 
orient the reader to the behavioral perspective.  
Second, it is intended to synthesize differing 
behavioral processes into a single model.  For 
example, although researchers (e.g., Dixon & 
Delaney, 2006) have argued, with data to 
back the argument (e.g., Wood & Clapham, 
2006), that verbal behavior is critical to our 
understanding of gambling, few attempts have 
been made to marry rule-governed and con-
tingency-governed processes into a single 
perspective.  Third, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, this paper is intended to provide a sin-
gle behavioral “theory” for gambling beha-
vior. 
 The importance of this third intention may 
not be immediately clear.  Behavior analysts 
have a long history of eschewing the hypothe-
tico-deductive approach to research.  Howev-
er, behavior analysis is not devoid of theories 
(e.g., Generalized Matching Law; Baum, 
1974) that have been derived from empirical, 
rather than rationalistic, sources (e.g., 
Herrnstein, 1961).  The primary value of such 
theories is that they spur research, even if they 
are ultimately challenged or give way to com-
peting viewpoints. 
     To date, no overt and encompassing beha-
vioral theory of gambling exists.  Thus, pre-
senting one may indeed serve to facilitate ad-
ditional behavior-analytic research.  An addi-
tional benefit is that researchers outside beha-
vior analysis often subscribe, sometimes quite 
heavily, to the hypothetico-deductive ap-
proach to research.  Having a behavioral 
theory in which to couch research may there-
fore aid behavioral researchers when seeking 
an outlet (and funding) for their research.  A 
similar argument can be made for therapists 
who may be required to provide theoretical 
justification for using behavioral treatments in 
treating individuals displaying gambling 
problems. 
 
Behavioral Contributions to the Explanation 
of Pathological Gambling 
     The behavioral perspective has not been 
silent on the factors contributing to gambling 
behavior.  The vast majority of the expla-
nations have pointed to contingency-driven 
factors.  That is, stimuli and/or consequences 
programmed by the game of chance itself that 
could potentially promote and maintain beha-
vior.  For instance, one of the longest standing 
tenets of the behavioral approach came from 
Skinner himself, who attributed the lure of 
gambling to the intermittent schedule of rein-
forcement used to pay off the player (Skinner, 
1953; Skinner, 1974).  More specifically, be-
cause most games of chance deliver wins on a 
random-ratio schedule of reinforcement, it 
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becomes possible to program a schedule of 
reinforcement (with money serving as the re-
ward) that maintains a high amount of beha-
vior despite being, over the long run, disad-
vantageous to the player (Skinner, 1974).  
Furthermore, research suggests that random-
ratio schedules may become even more effec-
tive at maintaining behavior, relative to fixed-
ratio schedules, as the response requirement 
becomes large or the organism is facing a 
negative-resource budget, both of which may 
be relevant to gambling situations and patho-
logical gamblers (see Madden, Ewan, & 
Lagorio, 2007). 
     Few would dispute the idea that the sche-
dule of reinforcement plays a role in main-
taining gambling behavior.  However, what 
has never been elucidated is why some indi-
viduals would come to display behavior that 
qualifies as pathological whereas other indi-
viduals, facing the identical schedule of rein-
forcement, would not (but see Madden et al., 
2007, for a recent treatment of this issue).  
Given that pathological gambling occurs in 1 
– 2% of the population (Petry, 2005), what is 
it about the intermittent schedule of rein-
forcement that affects these individuals diffe-
rently than the other 98 – 99% of people who 
face them?  To answer this question, beha-
vioral analysts would undoubtedly point to 
the difference in “reinforcement history” 
across individuals, histories that would make 
some individuals’ behavior more sensitive or 
susceptible than others to these intermittent 
schedules of reinforcement. 
     Unfortunately, the exact nature of that 
“history” has never been spelled out.  The his-
tory of the individual gambler is only known 
to a certain degree by an individual research-
er, clinician, or therapist.  Unlike the history 
of a laboratory animal that is completely con-
trolled, the history of the human gambler in 
the natural world may never be exactly 
known.  Furthermore, even when historical 
contingencies are discovered or reported dur-
ing therapy, the often distant and uncertain 
nature of the person’s history makes it diffi-
cult to determine the interaction it may be 
having with the present contingencies.  Per-
haps the most obvious example of the failure 
to account for gambling based on the intermit-
tent schedule is that of the behavior of the pa-
thological lottery player who, while never 
having won, continues to play week after 
week.  In such a situation, the individual may 
verbally identify what historical factors might 
contribute to such a behavior.  However, the 
authenticity and accuracy of those factors 
may be questionable. 
     Other behavioral theorists (e.g., Petry & 
Roll, 2001) have speculated that there are 
numerous additional contingency-driven as-
pects of the gambling situation that promote 
gambling behavior.  Beyond intermittent rein-
forcement, many games of chance alter the 
magnitude of reinforcement (e.g., video poker 
machines pay out differing amounts for dif-
ferent winning hands).  Basic behavioral re-
search has shown that organisms sometimes, 
but not always, prefer variable sized rewards 
to fixed amounts (see Madden et al., 2007, for 
a review).  Generalizing this finding to gam-
bling, varying the size of payouts would be 
expected to facilitate, rather than inhibit, 
gambling.  Unpredictable intermittent magni-
tudes of reinforcement may also help sustain 
gambling. 
     Petry and Roll (2001) also suggested that 
response cost and immediacy of 
reinforcement can promote gambling beha-
vior.  Response cost refers to increasing the 
likelihood of a behavior by decreasing the ef-
fort (or cost) of engaging in that behavior.  
For example, consider the following.  Most 
modern casinos have adopted slot machines 
that are equipped with bill collectors built into 
them (vs. having to find a casino employee 
selling coins), games that allow for multiple 
coins to be bet by the press of a single button 
(vs. having to put multiple coins into the ma-
chine manually), and/or devices that accumu-
late credits on the machine’s display (vs. dis-
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pensing coins into a trough and requiring the 
player to put them back into the machine).  
All of these modern modifications of gaming 
devices could be conceptualized as examples 
of reducing response cost.  From a behavioral 
perspective, gaming devices that lower re-
sponse cost should, theoretically, promote 
gambling. 
      In terms of immediacy of reinforcement, 
research has long shown that organisms prefer 
immediate over delayed rewards (e.g., Chung 
& Herrnstein, 1967).  Games of chance 
present the opportunity to obtain (sometimes 
substantial) monetary gains nearly instantly; 
gains that in some instances would take years 
to obtain through other means such as em-
ployment.  From this perspective, it is not 
surprising that people gamble.  Intuitively, 
one would think that these factors would also 
influence the potentially punishing 
consequences of gambling (i.e., losing mon-
ey).  However, the consequences of losing 
money are often themselves delayed, decreas-
ing their control over behavior (see Madden et 
al., 2007) and perhaps explaining why the re-
ported aversiveness of losing money is often 
less than what gamblers expect (Kermer, 
Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006).  The 
gambler may also habituate (e.g., see Thomp-
son & Spencer, 1966) to losses over time, fur-
ther limiting their suppressive effect on gam-
bling behavior. 
     These, among other potential factors, are 
reasonable and likely contributors to gam-
bling behavior.  However, much like Skin-
ner’s reference to intermittent schedules of 
reinforcement, such factors appear to fall 
short of identifying the causes of pathological 
behavior.  The characteristics of these game 
modifications do vary as a function of type of 
game (e.g., blackjack vs. lotteries), but all 
players who play a particular game face the 
same response cost and immediacy contin-
gencies when playing.  Again, it is not clear 
why these factors would lead a minority of 
gamblers down the road of pathology. 
     One behavioral attempt to explain why on-
ly certain individuals may become “addicted” 
was suggested by Rachlin (1997).  In this 
conceptualization, he outlined four different 
psychological theories of addiction that are 
consistent with the behavioral perspective.  
While Rachlin’s analysis was largely couched 
in the context of substance abuse, the theories 
are also relevant to gambling.  Rachlin’s pre-
ferred theory, called Relative-Addiction 
Theory, posits that “… consumption of the 
addictive substance creates an increase in 
price of both the addictive activity (X) and its 
substitute (Y).  Addiction occurs when X re-
mains cheaper than Y throughout consump-
tion.” (p. 468).  In the end, “repeated choice 
of X over Y … leads the addict to a point 
where the price of both activities is maximal.” 
(p. 468).   In this case, X represents gambling 
and Y represents other activities the gambler 
could engage in besides gambling (e.g., 
spending time with his/her family, golfing or 
bowling, etc.).  The more one gambles, the 
more expensive gambling becomes either be-
cause the gambler is in debt or, through the 
process of habituation, the gambler needs to 
risk an increasing amount of money to main-
tain the adequate amount of stimulation.  
However, the more one gambles, the more 
difficult it becomes to get as much from com-
peting activities as one once did.  For exam-
ple, untended or neglected relationships are 
not as rewarding as before; by not golfing or 
bowling, one’s ability to play well has dimi-
nished.  Thus, to return these competing activ-
ities to their previous level of reward, one 
must invest more effort and time engaging in 
them.  However, that investment exceeds the 
effort needed to continue to gamble.  In fact, 
it always will be easier to gamble than not 
gamble, but additional gambling further in-
creases the investment needed to engage in 
the competing activities.  This tradeoff ulti-
mately leads to pathology.   
     Rachlin’s approach has merit.  It does not 
rely solely on contingency-driven aspects of 
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the gambling situation itself (e.g., intermittent 
schedules of reinforcement, immediacy of 
reinforcement) to explain the lure of gam-
bling, although those aspects are incorporated 
into the theory.  Furthermore, it outlines a dy-
namic process in which the relative context of 
gambling would lead to maladaptive or patho-
logical behavior, as well as outlining how to 
prevent or reverse that cycle (i.e., invest more 
effort and time in competing activities).  Like 
the factors discussed above, however, it is not 
clear how the Relative-Addiction Theory ac-
counts for individual differences.  Although 
the theory may be able to explain some dif-
ferences across individuals (e.g., individuals 
from low socioeconomic levels may be more 
prone to pathological gambling than individu-
als from high socioeconomic levels because 
these individuals may have fewer competing 
activities to begin with), the theory does not 
clearly specify how some individuals can 
spend a great amount of time gambling yet 
not become pathological gamblers.  At best, at 
least one additional explanatory mechanism 
would appear to be needed. 
     Other researchers (e.g., Dixon & Delaney, 
2006) have argued that the missing mechan-
ism lacking in a contingency-driven theory of 
gambling involves verbal behavior.  To be 
more specific, behavior such as gambling can 
be controlled by the direct contingencies pre-
sented by the gambling situation itself, by 
learned verbal “rules” that govern the players’ 
behavior (that may or may not be accurate), or 
by both.  Only if the gambler was a nonverbal 
human could a pure contingency-driven 
theory of gambling be validated.  This point is 
why an animal model of gambling will always 
be somewhat lacking in external validity. 
     In attempts to support the conceptualiza-
tion that understanding the verbal behavior of 
the gambler is necessary to form a compre-
hensive account of pathological gambling, 
Dixon and his research team have repeatedly 
demonstrated that “rules” can augment, or 
potentially even overcome, the contingencies 
programmed in the gambling game.  For ex-
ample, Dixon (2000) employed a within-
subject design in which participants played 
roulette in several separate conditions.  
Across the conditions, participants were given 
no rules about the game and how to bet, were 
given inaccurate rules, or were given accurate 
rules.  Results demonstrated that participants’ 
gambling behavior was altered by the intro-
duction of rules even after players had expe-
rienced playing the game (in the condition 
that no rules were given) and thus had come 
into contact with the contingencies pro-
grammed by the game itself.  Dixon, Hayes, 
and Aban (2000) also tested the influence of 
rules.  They again had participants play rou-
lette.  However, in this study, both the out-
come of the game (i.e., winning or losing) and 
the type of instructions given to players were 
manipulated.  The researchers then performed 
a regression analysis on the results to deter-
mine what factors predicted when players 
would quit gambling.  The results showed that 
the only significant predictor of players’ quit-
ting was the instructions the participants had 
been given, not whether the players had won 
or lost.  In other words, the results suggested 
that the instructions given to the players were 
more important in controlling the participants’ 
gambling behavior than were the outcomes 
the participants actually experienced when 
gambling. 
     In a recent conceptualization of pa-
thological gambling, Dixon and Delaney 
(2006) suggested that to understand gambling 
problems, the focus of analysis must shift 
away from the contingencies of the game and 
toward the role of verbal behavior.  That role 
potentially takes on additional importance be-
cause some of the rules that govern the beha-
vior of gamblers may be self-generated.  For 
instance, a player who adopts the rule “I am 
bound to win big soon” may prove to be very 
impervious to large losses and may look quite 
irrational to an outside observer who does not 
have direct access to the self-generated rule.  
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Indeed, this possibility is consistent with ideas 
that have been raised by non-behavioral 
theorists.  Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin, and 
Doucet (2002), for example, argued that pa-
thological gamblers are prone to engage in 
fallacious reasoning and that reasoning leads 
them toward pathology.  One such example is 
gamblers’ failure to understand the indepen-
dence of turns (e.g., gamblers may think that 
if the ball has fallen on red on each of the last 
five spins of the roulette wheel, then the prob-
ability that it will fall on black on the next 
spin has increased; a conclusion that is erro-
neous because the outcome of any spin of the 
wheel is independent from previous out-
comes).  From a behavioral perspective, such 
a misunderstanding would qualify as a “rule” 
that is governing the behavior of the gambler, 
with the possibility that the gambler generated 
that rule him/herself. 
     Not all rules need to be self-generated.  In 
a casino environment, many rules / instruc-
tions are abundantly present, be they overt 
(e.g., “Everybody is a winner at …”) or covert 
(e.g., “Bet up to 100 credits”).  Dixon’s re-
search indicates that rules provided to the 
gambler can come to control the gambler’s 
behavior.  However, despite the growing evi-
dence that verbal behavior can play a signifi-
cant role in gambling and gambling problems, 
its importance suffers from similar problems 
as the non-verbal factors discussed above.  
All casino gamblers are exposed to the same 
overt rules, so it is not immediately clear why 
some of them would follow those rules more 
readily than others.  Perhaps it is only when 
we examine individuals’ propensity to follow 
rules (Wulfert, Greenway, Farkas, & Hayes, 
1994), the interaction of such rules and con-
tingencies, and how ex-posure to the envi-
ronment and external rules may result in the 
emergence of self-rules idiosyncratic to indi-
vidual players (Zlomke & Dixon, 2006), that 
we will be able to fully account for how ver-
bal behavior impacts the behavior of the 
gambler. 
     Although behavioral theorists eschew plac-
ing personality characteristics in a causal role, 
research has been able to document that the 
behavior of pathological gamblers may differ 
from non-pathological individuals on a meas-
ure independent of gambling.  Specifically, it 
appears that pathological gamblers discount 
future rewards at a greater rate than do non-
pathological individuals (e.g., Dixon, Marley, 
& Jacobs, 2003; see Madden et al., 2007, or 
Petry, 2005, for reviews).  When given the 
(hypothetical) opportunity between getting a 
small amount of money now or a large 
amount of money after a delay, non-
pathological individuals choose the large re-
wards at longer delays than do pathological 
gamblers.  In other words, future rewards do 
not appear to govern the behavior of patho-
logical gamblers as well as they govern the 
behavior of non-pathological individuals.  
Because of this “discounting,” the behavior of 
pathological gamblers appears prone to be 
controlled by immediate rewards 
(programmed by games of chance; Petry & 
Roll, 2001) and rules presented in the imme-
diate situation (e.g., “Everybody is a winner 
at …”) than the behavior of other individuals.  
This control may then cause these individuals 
to make decisions and generate rules that lead 
them down the road to pathological gambling. 
     The difference in discounting future re-
wards is an interesting finding, partly because 
it is an inherent assumption of Rachlin’s 
(1997) Relative-Addiction theory (i.e., gam-
blers may be insensitive to the future rewards 
associated with not gambling and instead 
choose the immediate opportunities for re-
ward that can be provided by gambling).  As 
noted numerous times, however, it again is 
not immediately clear why or how the differ-
ence in discounting between pathological and 
non-pathological gamblers comes about.  Fur-
thermore, it has been recently reported that 
pathological gamblers discount future rewards 
more severely in gambling contexts than in 
non-gambling contexts (Dixon, Jacobs, & 
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Sanders, 2006), suggesting situational control 
over what is often considered to be a trait 
measure. 
     Thus, although behavioral theory has not 
been silent on the issue of gambling behavior, 
a synthesized behavioral account has yet to be 
forwarded.  Researchers have identified fac-
tors related to games of chance that would be 
expected to promote gambling behavior.  Fur-
thermore, theorists have outlined scenarios in 
which competition between these factors and 
those controlling non-gambling behavior 
would lead individuals to choose gambling 
despite this choice being the poor one in the 
long run.  Researchers have also identified 
potential causal mechanisms (i.e., the presen-
tation of verbal “rules”) that can contribute to, 
if not outright control, gambling behavior.  
Additionally, they have identified that gam-
blers may differ from non-gamblers in ways 
that could explain why some come to suffer 
from gambling problems.  Together, these 
findings add to our understanding of gam-
bling.  However, even in sum, they do not 
identify why some individuals are susceptible 
to gambling problems when others are not or, 
when they do indicate how some individuals 
may indeed be more susceptible than others, 
there is little indication as to how the individ-
uals became that way. 
 
Establishing Operations and Setting Events 
     The above factors will certainly be impor-
tant to a comprehensive behavioral theory of 
gambling.  However, a major theoretical 
component, which includes establishing oper-
ations (Michael, 1993) and setting events 
(Kantor & Smith, 1975), has been missing.  
Establishing operations are situations or 
events that change the efficacy of a reinforcer 
and, as a result, change the probability that a 
certain behavior will occur.  For example, set-
ting one’s alarm clock is reinforced by the 
consequence of being awakened at a certain 
time and getting into bed serves as one dis-
criminative stimulus for setting the alarm 
clock.  However, one does not necessarily 
need to be awakened at a certain time every 
day of the week (e.g., on weekdays, but not 
weekends).  Day of the week would be consi-
dered an establishing operation in this exam-
ple because it dictates the efficacy of being 
awakened.  As an establishing operation, day 
of the week would alter whether getting into 
bed will result in the alarm clock being set or 
not.  A setting event, while often used inter-
changeably with establishing operation, is less 
transitional than the establishing operation.  
Examples of setting events might be getting 
cancer, a new relative living in your home, a 
season or weather pattern, etc.  In the scope of 
gambling, setting events could include getting 
a raise at work, becoming unemployed, being 
in an unsatisfying marriage, or moving into a 
neighborhood that has a casino.  In summary, 
the “momentary” nature of the establishing 
operation is not present with a setting event. 
     The potential importance of establishing 
operations and setting events in our under-
standing of gambling behavior has not been 
entirely ignored by behavior-analytic re-
searchers (e.g., see Dixon et al., 2003).  How-
ever, the idea has not been systematically pur-
sued.  Establishing operations and setting 
events represent potential mechanisms that 
will allow a behavioral theory to explain how 
some individuals may ultimately become pa-
thological gamblers while other individuals 
may face the same gambling situation and not 
suffer from pathology.  The question is; can 
one identify the environmental variables that 
serve as establishing operations or setting 
events for problem gambling?
 
     As noted above, there is a vast literature on 
gambling behavior.  Although little of that 
research has come from a behavior-analytic 
perspective, any successful behavioral theory 
must, at worst, account for the results of that 
research.  At best, it is possible that the exist-
ing research can inform the behavioral pers-
pective.  Fortunately, the latter appears to be 
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the case when identifying potential establish-
ing operations and setting events. 
     Petry (2005), in her extensive review of 
the gambling literature, identified six known 
risk factors for pathological gambling.  By far 
the most prominent of these factors is sub-
stance use and abuse.  Comorbidity of sub-
stance abuse and pathological gambling is so 
high that Petry recommends that therapists 
working with a member of one population 
screen for the presence of the other problem.  
The remaining risk factors are socioeconomic 
status (SES), minority membership, gender, 
age, and marital status.  In short, a young 
male of a minority group, who is poor, single, 
and is a drug user, is at high risk for becoming 
a pathological gambler. 
 
Known Risk Factors as Potential Establishing 
Operations/Setting Events. 
     According to the model being proposed in 
the present paper, several of these risk factors 
may influence gambling by serving as estab-
lishing operations or setting events.  One fac-
tor that should serve as a setting event is SES.  
Low SES should alter the reinforcing value of 
money, which should alter how one weights 
immediate vs. delayed monetary rewards.  
The shift toward more immediate rewards 
should promote gambling, which in turn will 
likely exacerbate the person’s monetary 
standing through losses.  Those losses will 
then further increase the reinforcing value of 
money that is immediately available.  This 
cycle would lead one down the road to patho-
logical gambling (and see Madden et al., 
2007, for a description of how SES may in-
fluence delay discounting). 
     It may also be the case that membership in 
a minority group may serve as a setting event.  
This possibility may be difficult to confirm 
because membership in a minority group is 
very often linked to SES.  Thus, members of 
minority groups may discount future rewards 
to a greater extent than members of the major-
ity because of low SES and not because of 
minority group membership per se.  However, 
culture factors may serve as establishing op-
erations (or setting events) independent of 
SES.  Specifically, cultural practices and 
norms, and how minority group members ex-
perience these, may make them vulnerable to 
pathological gambling more so than members 
of the majority culture.  The existing literature 
provides at least one potential example of this 
possibility.   
     Research suggests that American Indians 
suffer from pathological gambling at up to 16 
times the rate as the majority, non-native 
population (Wardman, el-Guebaly, & Hod-
gins, 2001).  Several different researchers 
have suggested that American Indians’ mental 
health (LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 
1993) and/or gambling problems (Raylu & 
Oei, 2004) are highly influenced by their cul-
tural competency.  That is, LaFromboise et al. 
(1993) argued that how American Indians 
identify with their own and with the majority 
culture greatly impacts their mental health.  
American Indians who identify with both cul-
tures (i.e., Bicultural identification) will bene-
fit with greater mental health than those who 
identify with only American Indian (i.e., Tra-
ditional) or the majority culture (i.e., Assimi-
lated).  Those with low identification with 
both cultures (i.e., Marginal) should be, ac-
cording to LaFromboise et al., very 
susceptible to mental health problems such as 
pathological gambling. 
     From a behavioral perspective, cultural 
identification of American Indians may be 
serving as a setting event.  One could hypo-
thesize that American Indians with Tradition-
al, Assimilated, or Marginal cultural identities 
should differ from those with Bicultural iden-
tities in terms of how they discount future re-
wards.  These identities may also correlate 
with what consequences maintain gambling 
behavior.  These differences would promote 
gambling and are what would make these in-
dividuals susceptible to suffering from gam-
bling problems.  Because majority group 
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members are not required to reconcile more 
than one cultural identity, one would predict 
that their prevalence of pathological gambling 
should be lower than those who must attempt 
such a reconciliation.  If anything, this exam-
ple highlights the potential predictive power 
that can be captured by incorporating factors 
into a model that are typically considered out-
side of the behavioral perspective (e.g., cul-
tural identity).  Factors such as cultural identi-
ty may be conceptualized within a behavioral 
framework as setting event.  Similar examples 
could easily be drawn with other minority 
populations. 
     Substance use and abuse could potentially 
be conceptualized as an establishing operation 
and a setting event, respectively.  That is, sub-
stance use may momentarily alter the conse-
quences for risky behavior whereas substance 
abuse may alter various response-reinforcer 
interactions within a psychological field over 
time.  However, although substance use is 
highly correlated with pathological gambling, 
it is not clear that it serves in a causal role, at 
least not to begin with.  Research has demon-
strated that, similar to pathological gamblers, 
individuals who are substance dependent, or 
suffer from addictive disorders, discount de-
layed rewards at a greater rate than do con-
trols (e.g., Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Pe-
try, 2001; and see Petry, 2005 for a review).  
In fact, some evidence exists to suggest that 
substance use and gambling behavior are not 
predictive of each other, but rather occur be-
cause of a similar underlying factor (Vitaro, 
Brendgen, Ladouceur, & Tremblay, 2001).  
That factor may be delay discounting.  If in-
creases in discounting delayed rewards indeed 
make individuals more prone to gamble and 
become pathological gamblers, then it is logi-
cal that it would also make them more prone 
to use drugs and become chronic users.  This 
view is a testable one.  It should be possible to 
demonstrate that changes in delay discounting 
precede drug use (and pathological 
gambling). 
     This view also does not preclude the idea 
that chronic drug use can contribute to patho-
logical gambling.  It may in fact do so if the 
drug use leads the individual into financial 
debt.  In such an instance, one would expect 
the individual to discount delayed rewards 
(much as would a person with low SES).  
This latter point could potentially explain why 
individuals who are substance abusers and 
gamblers discount future rewards at a signifi-
cantly greater rate than those individuals who 
are only substance abusers (Petry & Casarella, 
1999). 
     As Petry (2005) pointed out, marital status 
as a risk factor for pathological gambling is 
difficult to interpret.  The fact that pathologi-
cal gamblers are more likely to be single or 
divorced than non-pathological gamblers is 
very possibly the outcome of the pathological 
gambling rather than a cause for it.  Fortu-
nately, this assumption is also a testable one.  
For example, if true, then it should be possi-
ble to document that differences in how indi-
viduals discount delayed rewards varies as a 
function of their gambling behavior, not as a 
function of their marital status. 
     It also seems reasonable to posit that age 
serves as a setting event and does so by alter-
ing the value of the monetary outcome of 
gambling.  In general, winning money 
becomes less important as one grows older, 
likely because one has accumulated wealth 
one did not have when young.  How individu-
als discount future rewards also likely varies 
with age.  Young individuals discount future 
rewards more steeply than older individuals, 
leading to impulsive behavior (see Logue, 
1995, for a review).  The ability of delayed 
rewards to control behavior increases with 
age, leading to an increase in the display of 
self control (e.g., Rachlin, 1974).  Thus, in 
general, the changes in delay discounting that 
come with age should work against the ap-
pearance of pathological gambling; this again 
is consistent with the existing data on patho-
logical gambling. 
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     However, changes in delay discounting 
with age may be bitonic.  That is, it seems 
likely that the discounting of delayed rewards 
again begins to occur more steeply as individ-
uals become increasingly old because, as the 
individual’s future shortens, immediate re-
wards should start to gain more and more 
control over behavior.  If true, then this 
change should promote the appearance of pa-
thological gambling in the elderly.  It should 
be possible to document this change in the 
discounting functions.  Even if this change 
does occur, however, the elderly may be buf-
fered against developing into pathological 
gamblers because of their SES or because 
they are gambling as an escape rather than to 
win money. 
     Age may also contribute to pathological 
gambling outside of serving as a setting event.  
Specifically, the reinforcing consequence of 
gambling may change as individuals age.  Re-
search suggests that young individuals who 
gamble (e.g., college students; Neighbors, 
Lostutter, Larimer, & Takushi, 2002) do so 
most often to win money.  However, as indi-
viduals age, they are increasing likely to 
gamble for entertainment (i.e., arousal) and/or 
as an escape from boredom (see Petry, 2005, 
for a review).  If the consequence maintaining 
the gambling behavior plays a role in whether 
the individual will become a problem gamb-
ler, then one would (correctly) predict that 
young individuals would be more prone to 
suffer from gambling problems than would 
aged individuals. 
     It is not clear how the final factor, gender, 
serves as a setting event as it remains a con-
stant for most individuals throughout their 
lives.  Yet, prior investigations have shown 
gender differences do exist when evaluating 
gamblers.  For instance, research suggests that 
males and females differ in terms of their pre-
ference for different games of chance, with 
men preferring card games and sports betting 
and women preferring slot machines and bin-
go (e.g., Mok & Hraba, 1991).  Additionally, 
a fairly vast amount of research indicates that 
males are more impulsive than females (e.g., 
Calvete & Cardeñoso, 2005; Soloff, Kelly, 
Strotmeyer, Malone, & Mann, 2003) and that 
that impulsivity (i.e., discounting future re-
wards more steeply than females) may play a 
role in gambling problems (e.g., Martins, Ta-
vares, Lobo, Galetti, & Gentil, 2004; Petry, 
Kirby, & Kranzler, 2002).  If gender indeed 
serves as a critical variable, then it should be 
possible to document differences in delay dis-
counting between genders.   
 
A Role for Verbal Behavior. 
     As noted above, verbal rules can augment 
the actual contingencies of games of chance 
to further promote gambling or they may 
completely overcome those contingencies al-
together.  Thus, any comprehensive account 
for pathological gambling should identify the 
role of verbal behavior.  To date, research 
suggests that verbal behavior might actually 
play multiple roles in the appearance of pa-
thological gambling.  One role verbal rules 
might play is as discriminative stimuli.  The 
rules may, properly or improperly, indicate to 
the gambler that bets, games, or patterns of 
playing will now be reinforced (e.g., “I lost at 
blackjack last time, so this time I will win”).  
If, as discriminative stimuli, these rules lead 
to large monetary losses, they make the indi-
vidual prone to pathological gambling.  For-
tunately, if verbal rules are serving as discri-
minative stimuli, then their influence should 
be open to change through the consequences 
experienced by the gambler who is following 
them. 
     The second potential role of verbal beha-
vior (i.e., rules) may be to serve as a type of 
establishing operation.  If individuals sub-
scribe to rules that alter the efficacy of the 
consequence maintaining gambling behavior 
(e.g., it’s more important to win than to have 
fun), then those rules may alter how individu-
als discount future rewards.  In the literature 
on rule-governed behavior, these types of 
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rules are termed Augmentals (Hayes, 1989; 
Valdivia, Luciano, & Molina, 2006), and are 
considered a type of verbal establishing oper-
ation.  Examples of such a rule might be “Hot 
slots, hot lights, lots of fun”, “What happens 
in Vegas stays in Vegas”, or “Loosest slots in 
town” and any of the other witty commercial 
slogans used by the gaming and tourist indus-
try.  Here the rule does not describe a beha-
vior-contingency relationship but instead po-
tentially alters the reinforcing value of gam-
bling altogether.   
     Self-generated rules may serve a variety of 
functions for an individual gambler, thus an 
analysis of their topography alone is insuffi-
cient to explaining the controlling variables.  
Take for example the sentence “I have my 
lucky Red Sox shirt on.”  To the casual reader, 
this sentence may do little if anything to sti-
mulate gambling (i.e., if someone gave you 
this shirt, you would not feel inclined to gam-
ble).  However, consider the following exam-
ple and how this sentence may have an indi-
vidualized functional relationship with gam-
bling.  Upon entering the casino a novice 
gambler finds an empty chair at a slot ma-
chine.  The machine is of the variety “Red, 
White, and Blue” in which large payoffs are 
made when three sets of bars line the payoff 
window.  Over the course of one hour of play, 
this individual comes close to winning a 
number of times, and then, with one more 
spin of the reels, wins a large jackpot when 
three sets of red bars land on the win line.  
Obviously excited, this player informs his 
friend of what has occurred, who proclaims 
“Red must be your lucky color.”  The next 
day, recalling the phrase from the prior day, 
the gambler selects a red shirt to wear the next 
morning.  Even upon seeing the shirt in the 
closet, an increased tendency to gamble is re-
ported.  Despite attempts to draw this person 
out of the casino, he repeatedly states, “I will 
win. I am wearing my lucky shirt.”  While the 
red shirt has never been paired with winning, 
or perhaps even gambling, certain psycholog-
ical functions have emerged between the red 
bars of the slot machine, money won, the 
friend’s comment, and a shirt with the word 
“Red Sox” on it. 
     The specific means by which such indivi-
dualized psychological functions are devel-
oped is beyond the scope of the present paper, 
and the reader is encouraged to seek out more 
comprehensive accounts of the development 
of complex stimulus networks in the context 
of gambling (e.g., Dixon & Delaney, 2006; 
Zlomke & Dixon, 2006).  To suffice, it is 
clear that complex stimulus networks and the 
resulting self-generated rules likely contribute 
to the between-person differences observed in 
development of pathological gambling. 
 
Beyond Programmed Reinforcement Contin-
gency Control 
     Early behavioral conceptualizations of pa-
thological gambling were solely limited to 
contingency control.  Intermittent rein-
forcement of the gaming device was respon-
sible for sustained behavior.  However, pa-
thological gamblers are not in closed envi-
ronments.  That is, the outcome of a gamble is 
not the only source of reinforcement to which 
they are exposed.  Instead, the gambling con-
text is dynamic and presents a variety of 
sources of reinforcement.  Some of the 
reinforcement options may be available 
conjointly, whereas others might be available 
concurrently.  For example, a problem gamb-
ler may seem clearly foolish if he or she re-
peatedly gambles and loses trial after trial.  
However, if that gambler is wagering only 
small amounts of money and is receiving 
complementary items while doing so, then 
this behavior may look less foolish. 
     The gambling response and the outcome of 
the gamble alone (i.e., money), is far from the 
sole controlling contingency in place for 
many people with gambling problems.  It is 
very possible that one individual may gamble 
for the possibility of increased monetary out-
comes, but another may engage in gambling 
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to escape from problems at home or work.  
Still another person may gamble as a means 
to socialize with friends at a weekly card 
game.  While the behavior itself may be simi-
lar, the functional controlling variables are 
not.  Individualized assessment and treatment 
of pathological gamblers is crucial for suc-
cessful treatment outcome and usually in-
volves replacement activities that serve the 
same behavioral function (see Petry, 2005).  
In summary, contingencies of reinforcement 
are surely at work for any given gambler, yet 
limiting the description of such contingencies 
to the outcome of the gamble are overly sim-
plistic and fail to consider the other behavior-
contingency interactions that are present in 
the broader contextual environment. 
 
The Integrative Behavioral Model of Gam-
bling 
     The proposed model tries to take into ac-
count the evidence presented above.  That 
evidence suggests that there are likely three 
mechanisms that lead to or sustain problem or 
pathological gambling. Contingencies, Rules, 
and Establishing Operations/Setting Events 
all interact in a dynamic contextual medium 
participating in varying degrees across indi-
vidual gamblers.  The first is the presence of 
an establishing operation or setting event that 
alters the efficacy of the consequence main-
taining gambling behavior.  That change in 
efficacy influences gambling behavior by al-
tering how the individual discounts delayed 
rewards.  Specifically, establishing op-
erations/setting events such as SES, gender, 
cultural identity, age, and (potentially) verbal 
“rules” increase how steeply individuals dis-
count delayed rewards, which in turn pro-
motes gambling and leads to problem or pa-
thological gambling.  The second mechanism 
is the consequence that is maintaining the 
gambling behavior.  Gambling provides mul-
tiple consequences.  Under the proposed 
model, individuals gambling for monetary 
gain will be prone to pathological behavior.  
Individuals who gamble for excitement or as 
an escape response should be less prone to 
become pathological gamblers unless, through 
losses incurred by gambling for excitement or 
as an escape, winning money becomes the 
primary reason for continued gambling.  Fac-
tors such as age or the establishment of cer-
tain verbal rules may also alter what conse-
quences control gambling and thus also con-
tribute to pathological gambling.  The third 
mechanism is verbal rules serving as discri-
minative stimuli for gambling.  If these rules 
are fallacious, then they may not only pro-
mote gambling, but also alter the conse-
quence(s) maintaining the gambling behavior.  
If these rules lead to losses, and thus an in-
crease in the efficacy of winning money, then 
they will serve to promote pathological gam-
bling. 
 
Advantages of the Model 
     The proposed model has a number of as-
pects to recommend it.  First, as noted several 
times already, it is consistent with the existing 
data on pathological gambling.  In fact, in 
some cases the existing research is so consis-
tent that the data actually identify the beha-
vioral mechanism.  Second, unlike prior be-
havioral explanations for gambling, it pro-
vides theoretical mechanisms (i.e., rule reper-
toire and establishing operations/setting 
events) to account for how the same contin-
gencies (e.g., intermittent schedules of rein-
forcement programmed by games of chance) 
may lead some individuals toward pathologi-
cal behavior but not do so for other individu-
als.  This hurdle is an important one for sev-
eral different reasons, with one being that be-
havioral theorists will not be required to rely 
on the nebulous explanation of “differences in 
reinforcement history.”  Third, the present 
model, unlike past behavioral explanations, 
incorporates verbal behavior and the impor-
tance of verbal rules followed by gamblers.  
Not only is this incorporation novel, it is also 
multifaceted.  Verbal behavior itself is com-
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plex and how it interacts with gambling beha-
vior is unlikely to be simple and straightfor-
ward.  Perhaps most importantly, advances in 
our understanding of verbal behavior have a 
home in the present model.  Fourth, the model 
makes a number of testable predictions.  By 
doing so, it outlines a number of studies inter-
ested researchers could conduct to test the 
theory’s validity.  Importantly, the present 
model also allows for an independent measure 
of pathology.  That is, much of the proposed 
theory lies in the idea that how one discounts 
delayed rewards is a causal force behind pa-
thological gambling.  This idea is not only 
consistent with the existing literature (see 
Madden et al., 2007, and Petry, 2005, for re-
views), but one can study delay discounting 
independently of pathological gambling.  
Fifth, because the model identifies causal me-
chanisms for pathological gambling, it will 
also identify specific treatment options for 
pathological gamblers.  Exactly what those 
treatments should be will depend upon how 
well future research supports the theory and 
exactly which mechanism is controlling the 
pathological gambling of a particular individ-
ual.  However, at the risk of being premature, 
these treatments will need to address the es-
tablishing operations that have altered the ef-
ficacy of the consequence maintaining the 
gambling, the verbal rules that the individu-
al’s behavior is being controlled by, and/or 
the consequence (i.e., money, arous-
al/excitement, and escape) reinforcing the 
gambling. 
     Finally, the model is relatively inclusive.  
As should be apparent from the above discus-
sion, although it is a behavioral theory, it can 
successfully incorporate factors that contri-
bute to gambling that come from different 
perspectives (e.g., cultural identity).  This fact 
should help promote gambling research that is 
couched in behavioral terms.  Perhaps more 
importantly, a successful behavioral theory 
could stand to enlighten, rather than simply 
explain, research from other perspectives.  
For instance, it is becoming increasingly pop-
ular for researchers to attempt to determine 
how brain function relates to behavior such as 
pathological gambling (e.g., Potenza et al., 
2003a, 2003b).  By identifying different caus-
al mechanisms, the present theory may serve 
to point such researchers to specific areas of 
the brain. 
     It seems quite possible that some of the 
ideas proposed in the present paper will need 
to be modified as new research tests them and 
new results emerge.  It may also be the case 
that some of these ideas will prove either in-
correct or incorrectly weighted in the present 
model.  These possibilities notwithstanding, 
the present model is an attempt to present a 
synthesized behavioral approach to gambling, 
to provide a theoretical basis for future inves-
tigations of gambling behavior and its treat-
ment, and to identify specific testable predic-
tions for behavioral researchers.  If any of 
these attempts are in any way fruitful, then the 
present model will fill a major void in the be-
havioral literature on gambling. 
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